INTRODUCTION
Thailand is a unitary government, that prior to its recent efforts to decentralize, was characterized as a highly centralized fiscal system that granted limited local autonomy in terms of functions, area, staffing, funding and decision making. The extent of its centralization is shown by recent fiscal indicators, included below:
• The central government spends over 90 percent of total general expenditures and collects 95 percent of general tax revenues.
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• Only 25 percent of municipal revenues are locally collected and retained.
• The central government appoints chief local officials, determines local salaries and approves local budgets.
Over the past decade, various means of decentralizing authority and responsibility to local governments have been discussed. It was broadly recognized that local government capacity would need to be strengthened considerably if the central government were to lessen its role in the intergovernmental fiscal system. Most Thai local governments have limited capacity for financial management, planning and service delivery, and generally lack adequate resources to deliver services effectively or to provide needed investments. While many proposals had been put forth, the Government's decentralization agenda did not gain momentum until the new Constitution was passed in 1997.
Four years have passed since the new Constitution's mandate for decentralization, and the Government is still in the early stages of implementing decentralization. There is no doubt, however, that decentralization will fundamentally change the way that public services are provided and financed in Thailand. This paper reviews the progress that has been achieved in Thailand's decentralization to date, and assesses its prospects for success. The next sections review the existing intergovernmental fiscal system in Thailand and the decentralization reforms; how functional responsibility might be realigned between the central government and local governments and among local governments themselves; opportunities for enhancing the revenue mobilization of local governments; what changes are needed in the intergovernmental transfer system; and how local accountability might be promoted. The paper concludes with prospects for improving the process of decentralization.
GLOBAL EXPERIENCE WITH DECENTRALIZATION
Decentralization is a global phenomenon, and this trend is increasingly important in Asia. Thailand's 8 th Plan and new Constitution place heavy emphasis on decentralization. From the World Bank's perspective, decentralization is neither good nor bad. 3 If it is designed well, it can strengthen accountability by moving decision making closer to the Thai people, enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of service delivery, improve economic growth, and offer a potential tool for fighting poverty. However, decentralization design is complicated, since it spans political, fiscal, and administrative policies and institutions.
If decentralization is designed badly or is introduced without strong local participation and accountability, it can lead to macroeconomic instability, declining service levels, heightened conflicts, corruption, and collapse of the safety net. The main challenges are to balance responsibilities with resources, accountability and capacity; and create incentives for the implementation of decentralization to match formal decentralization arrangements.
A review of decentralization experience in other countries has shown that its success or failure often depends on whether a coherent decentralization strategy has been developed, and whether adequate mechanisms exist for developing, monitoring and implementing the decentralization strategy. A decentralization strategy should include:
• a clear division of responsibilities (who does what in spending and taxing);
• adequate financing; and
• a clear system of accountability (who is accountable to whom).
Mechanisms for developing, monitoring and implementing a decentralization strategy should include: legal and regulatory frameworks; coordinating mechanisms; accurate, timely and comprehensive information on the decentralization process; and capacity building programs.
Creating a supportive environment for decentralization can be challenging. The key is to design arrangements that are consistent and that achieve the benefits of decentralization while minimizing unintended consequences. These arrangements involve a combination of intergovernmental fiscal relations, accountability mechanisms, channels for administrative responsibility and oversight, and capacity building programs. In addition, trust among levels of government must be established, as well as mechanisms for resolving conflicts.
International experience shows that decentralization can be a key means to improve governance, provided that it is well designed. By clearly defining what level of government is responsible for providing and financing various services and delegating appropriate authority, responsibility and resources, local services may be provided more effectively and local accountability may be enhanced. The success of decentralization will depend on the extent to which political and economic institutions promote local accountability and responsible fiscal policies. Because these institutions are nascent in Thailand, a strong system of local accountability must be developed, since greater resources devolved to local governments can lead to misused or wasted funds. Similarly, without an appropriate balance between expenditures and revenues, public service levels may deteriorate in a decentralized context.
And finally, unless local governments pursue responsible fiscal policies, macroeconomic instability may arise in the form of higher overall fiscal deficits or central government "bailouts" of weak local governments.
Reducing the role of the central government and moving toward a decentralized fiscal system will require significant changes in existing Thai institutions, processes and culture. The Ministries of Public Health and Education are decentralizing service delivery to local entities (i.e., Local Education Authorities and Provincial Hospitals), that in the future may be transferred to local governments. Changes in the intergovernmental transfer system that improve the targeting of subsidies to the poor can enhance service delivery. And effective decentralization is impossible without broader reforms in financial and human resource management underway as part of the Government's public sector reform.
EVOLUTION OF THE DECENTRALIZATION AGENDA
Strengthening local government was identified as a policy priority in the Government's 7th National Economic and Social Development Plan (1991-1996) and Eighth Plan (1997 Plan ( -2001 . 4 The 7th Plan emphasized developing local infrastructure facilities, providing credit to expand and improve local services, and assisting local authorities in mobilizing capital and formulating development projects. The 8th Plan emphasized strengthening the management and budgetary capability of local institutions, and supporting decentralization. The Department of Local Administration within the Ministry of Interior has an ongoing training program to enhance local capabilities in three areas: (i) local administrative systems (i.e., staff regulations, accounting systems, etc.); (ii) developing tax and property maps to enhance local revenue collections and increasing local tax rates; and (iii) training local personnel.
The need for greater local revenue generation is also well recognized. In 1993, the Ministry of Finance identified a series of reforms that would significantly improve local revenues, and they were approved by the Cabinet in 1994. These nine measures-ranging from changing aspects of tax administration, increasing shared tax revenues, and instituting new taxes on owner occupied property and tobacco-were estimated to increase local revenues by as much as 80 percent (see Box 1). Implementation of these reforms was impeded by the need to amend 40 related laws, gain Cabinet approval, and assure interministerial coordination.
In January 1997, a Local Fiscal Master Plan was approved by the Cabinet. This Master Plan was drafted by the Fiscal Policy Office and it identified numerous measures (17) to enhance local revenues, clarify expenditure responsibility, reform the intergovernmental transfer (subsidy) system, establish systems for monitoring and evaluating local fiscal systems, promote new methods of mobilizing capital for local investment, and develop local capacity. The Master Plan set the framework for many of the proposed reforms in decentralization.
The new Constitution strongly supports decentralization and specifies principles of local autonomy and elected local representatives, among other aspects of local governance.
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Objectives envisioned in the Constitution include increasing the share of local government expenditures, assigning more revenue sources to local governments, revising the system of intergovernmental transfers to provide grants in a more transparent and predictable way, and promoting mechanisms for local accountability.
A National Commission on Public Sector Reform was established as an outgrowth of the Constitution, and it includes a Decentralization Subcommittee. This Subcommittee is composed of three working groups: (i) Local Administrative Organizations; (ii) Improving the Fiscal Status of Local Governments; and (iii) Local Civil Service Administration. A working principle of the Decentralization Subcommittee is that no level of local government should be made absolutely worse off as a result of reforms brought about by the decentralization process. Draft legislation was prepared by each of the working groups to define central-versus-local responsibilities, reform local budgeting and expenditure management, assign adequate local revenues, and reform the intergovernmental grant system. This legislation-including the National Decentralization Act and eight laws-establishes the framework for decentralization and new intergovernmental fiscal relations (see Box 2).
The National Decentralization Act became effective on 18 November 1999. This Act defines the roles and responsibilities of the National Decentralization Committee (NDC; see Box 3). The NDC is responsible for defining many of the policy parameters for the decentralization legal framework, implementing this framework, and monitoring decentralization outcomes. The NDC has four sub-committees: (i) Strategic Planning; (ii) Finance/Budget/Personnel; (iii) Legal; and (iv) Monitoring and Evaluation. The Strategic Planning Sub-Committee has taken the lead in guiding the NDC, and in producing the Decentralization Action Plan. The Finance and Budget Sub-Committee is chaired by the Deputy Minister of Finance, with significant input from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Secretary General of the Civil Service Commission. This Sub-Committee has focused its work on the assignment of expenditure and revenue raising responsibility. These assignments will vary depending on the local government structure (see Box 4).
Box 3. Roles of The National Decentralization Committee
The National Decentralization Committee (NDC) is responsible for: ! Producing a Decentralization Plan for submission to the Cabinet and Parliamentary approval that:
! defines the relationships and functional responsibilities between the central and local governments, as well as among local governments, including the allocation of functions, subsidies and central government budget; ! defines local revenue sources and identifies means to improve local tax and revenue mobilization; ! outlines the stages and means to transfer functions from the central government to local governments; ! recommends means to coordinate the transfer of public officials from the central government, local governments, and state enterprises relative to new assignments of functions and resources. ! Proposing criteria or parameters for allocating resources among different levels of government including subsidies and central budget. ! Proposing legislation, decrees, regulations, administrative guidelines and rules to implement the decentralization plan in a timely manner. ! Proposing a system to achieve transparency and public participation at the local level in terms of government functions. ! Monitor progress in implementing the Decentralization Plan.
The NDC is authorized to draw up Action Plan(s) to determine the procedures to decentralize administrative powers to local administrations. The NDC will seek Cabinet approval of the Action Plan(s); once the Cabinet has approved the Plan(s), they will be submitted to Parliament for consideration and announced in the Government Gazette. Once the Action Plan(s) have been signed into law, they will be legally binding in terms of agencies' operations.
Box 4. Structure of Thai Local Governments
Local governments in Thailand are statutory bodies of the national government and exist in six forms: (i) Provincial Administrative Organizations (PAOs), (ii) Municipalities; (iii) Bangkok Municipal Administration (a special form of province/municipality with greater local autonomy); (iv) Pattaya City (a special form of municipality); (v) Sanitary Districts; and (vi) Tambon Administrative Organizations (TAOs). Each local entity is independent and has equal legal status. ! Provincial Administrative Organizations (PAOs), act on behalf of the national government, and support local administration by constructing and maintaining local roads, providing water, and other limited services to residents in rural areas. PAOs were established in 1955 to accelerate the development of local administrations in the rural areas outside of sanitary districts and municipalities. The creation of TAOs in 1994 substantially diminished PAO responsibilities. At present there are 75 PAOs, corresponding to the number of provinces. PAOs are subdivided into provincial districts (767 provincial districts currently exist) and are administered by centrally appointed officials. In early 1999, legislation was approved to enhance PAOs' role in planning, investment, and service provision in each province, as well as coordinating functions delegated to lower-level governments. This legislation also specifies that PAOs will receive a larger portion of existing revenues already shared with TAOs and other local authorities, including 5 percent of the VAT funds assigned to local governments. ! Municipalities are the most well-established form of local government, and generally occupy urbanized areas in 149 cities, as well as 983 former sanitary districts (see bullet below). Municipalities are classified into three categories-city (nakorn), town (muang) and township (tambon)-depending on their size and community characteristics, and their category defines their responsibilities. Municipal councils and executive committees are elected and authorized to undertake most functions. The mayor is appointed by the provincial governor based on the party receiving the most votes in the election. Despite significant growth pressures, new municipalities are rarely created nor expanded through annexation. As a result, the majority of urbanized activities-about 80 percent-is occurring outside of municipal boundaries, which impedes the achievement of decentralization objectives, diminishes the efficiency and quality of services delivered, and hinders local management and planning. ! Sanitary Districts (SD) were established in 1909 to provide facilities and services to protect public health and safety (e.g., collect and dispose of solid waste, maintain local roads and drains, provide street lighting, etc.) to densely populated areas outside of municipalities. SDs served as the administrative center of each provincial district, hence most SDs are located in rural areas. SDs were administered by a board composed of elected members and appointed officials. Before the SD legislation was passed, there were 1,050 SDs in Thailand; 983 of these SDs were upgraded to municipality status by the new legislation. This upgrading to municipality status has occurred without consideration of which local government structure would enhance local autonomy and service delivery, for example, by considering which SDs should be annexed by neighboring municipalities, which should be merged with adjacent SDs, and which should be converted to municipalities. ! Tambon Administrative Organizations (TAOs) were established in 1994 to serve areas outside of municipalities and SDs. They are designed to provide basic services and facilities, predominantly in rural village areas. At present there are over 7,000 TAOs, and they are governed by a council assembly (elected) and a council executive (generally appointed). Most TAOs are too small and fragmented to be efficient, viable or accountable units of local government-in terms of meeting their responsibilities for infrastructure, environment, human resource development and health care; in raising revenues; and in effectively supporting participatory governance. Many are too small to even support a primary school. The numerous TAOs within ecological regions (e.g., watersheds and river basins, airsheds, etc.) impede coordinated environmental or natural resources planning and management. Proposals have suggested that many of the TAOs should be consolidated so that only 1,000 to 1,500 TAOs exist with each having a critical mass of population, area and resources. ! Special Administrative Organizations (SAOs) have been proposed based on the successful model of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), which was established in 1972. 1 BMA operates as a unitary government extending across the geographical equivalent of a province. At present, the Governor of BMA is the only directly elected local government official in Thailand. The Thai Government has agreed to establish other equivalent local governments known as SAOs. These SAOs would be established in areas with high economic and social development with a geographic boundary coterminous with the province or some part thereof. Proposals for transforming Phuket and Pattaya City into a SAO (encompassing the entire provincial area) are under consideration, and other possibilities include Songkhla, Nakorn Ratchasima, Chachoengsao, Chonburi and Rayong.
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL FRAMEWORK Assignment of Expenditure Functions
The Decentralization Act defines six functions to be transferred to local administrative organizations: (i) infrastructure; (ii) promotion of quality of life; (iii) maintenance of social order and peace; (iv) planning and investment promotion, commerce and tourism; (v) management and conservation of natural resources and the environment; and, (vi) arts, culture, tradition, and local wisdom. These functions will be transferred based on the powers and duties of various local administrative organizations, ranging from small organizations like municipalities, to larger provincial administrative organizations, to special organizations like the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration. The Act further specifies three types of duties to be to transferred: (i) those performed by a local administrative organization or jointly with other local administrative organizations, or for which they purchase the services of the private sector, the state or other local administrative organizations; (ii) those performed jointly among local administrative organizations and the state; and (iii) duties performed by the state, that could be performed by local administrative organizations. Administrative power will be devolved in a phased approach so that both the central government and the local governments are prepared to assume their new roles.
The Master Plan to decentralize administrative power to local administrations has been completed and includes the general framework, objectives and guidelines to decentralize administrative power in accordance with Section 30 of the Act. It identifies three stages in implementing decentralization:
• The first stage, from 2001 through 2004, focuses on transferring functions for planning and sequencing decentralization; improving the administrative system within local and regional administrations; eliminating overlapping functions between central and local administrations; and strengthening local capacity to manage transferred functions, personnel, revenue and assets effectively.
• During the second, "transitional" stage, from 2005 through 2010, the roles of regional and local administrations, and civil society will be adjusted based on lessons learned in the previous period.
• After the tenth year-2011 and beyond-local citizens are expected to have a better quality of life and better access to public services and facilities, and local communities are expected to play a greater role in decision-making, overseeing, and supporting local administrations. Local administrations are expected to be more self-reliant and autonomous, and to have improved their capacity in local finance and administration.
The NDC must define central-local expenditure functions more clearly, i.e., identifying specific expenditure assignments that are compulsory rather than voluntary. Only with clarity in expenditure assignment can the overlapping functions performed by the central and local governments be eliminated, and expenditure effectiveness improved. The central government is responsible for decentralizing decision-making and administrative power for financial, fiscal and personnel administration to each type of local administration, and for transferring functions and responsibility between the central government and local administrations. The central government's responsibilities include:
• strengthening local capacity and promoting civic participation;
• adjusting the roles of central and regional administrations, and internal structures of local administrations;
• amending relevant laws and regulations; and It has been proposed to the NDC that decentralization should occur in tandem with competition in service delivery and improved efficiency and equity of service delivery. In assigning new expenditure responsibilities, local governments could be viewed as consumers of services for their populations: in this model, they would shop around to purchase services-from national agencies, state enterprises, the private sector, voluntary organizations or other local governments-or deliver them themselves. For this transformation to take place, national service delivery agencies must face incentives to become smaller or more efficient providers of services to local governments-one clear incentive would be by gradually reducing their operating budgets. A case study of this redefinition of expenditure responsibilities in Petchaburi has been undertaken by local researchers.
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A significant portion of local expenditures (approximately 40 to70 percent) are centrally mandated; the largest category of these mandated expenditures are personnel expenses (representing, on average, 30 percent of local budgets). Local authorities are required to hire a number of personnel and to pay salaries, wages, and benefits according to central mandates which often result in over staffing and overspending. No special allowances are made by the central government to offset these extra costs. In addition, the organizational structure, staffing levels and staff appointments of local governments are currently controlled by central agencies (e.g., the Municipal Personnel Commission and DOLA), thereby limiting the flexibility of local governments to manage their own personnel. A separate Local Government Civil Service Commission, as proposed by the Working Group on Local Civil Service Administration, could be established and local personnel management authority delegated to local governments gradually over time.
Local Revenues
Sub-national governments rely heavily on shared taxes and subsidies from the central Government. As shown below in Table 1 , in FY00, it is estimated that 43 percent of local revenues and subsidies (transfers) were from shared taxes, 44 percent from subsidies, and Heavy reliance on shared taxes and subsidies reduces local accountability in Thailand, and also reduces the predictability of revenue flows. From a decentralization perspective, shared taxes and subsidies are essentially the same. Shared taxes do not provide local governments with autonomy unless they have some ability to adjust the tax rate. In the Thai context, shared tax revenue is typically easier to predict than subsidies from the central government, which in the past were typically allocated in an ad hoc way.
As additional responsibilities are devolved to local governments, they must improve their local revenue mobilization, both by reforming existing taxes (e.g., introducing a local, broad-based property tax) and by enhancing collections of existing charges and fees. A bill entitled the "Local Government Revenue Act" will specify general responsibilities for assigning all taxes within the two-tier structure of newly reformed PAOs and all other local governments. In addition, the "Nine Policy Measures" to improve local revenue mobilization (summarized in Box 1) have made slow progress towards legal status. Each of the nine measures must be promulgated separately since each affects government agencies differently.
Passage and full implementation of the draft Property Tax Act, which amalgamates the Land and Building Tax and Land Development Tax could potentially provide local governments with a significant stream of local revenues. Concurrent reforms in the Central Valuation Agency (CVA) within the Department of Land would need to be undertaken to strengthen the base of the new property tax. Local tax administration capacity must be improved over time to take full advantage of the property tax and other existing revenue sources.
The proposed devolution of revenue authority is based on the goal that, by the end of the 8th Plan period (2001), the share of local revenue relative to total government revenues (including intergovernmental transfers) will be 20 percent (as shown in Table 1 above). In addition, local revenues are expected to increase to 35 percent of total government revenues by the end of the 9th Plan period (2006) . Whether this objective is driven by an offloading of expenditure responsibility to local governments in light of the need to reduce the central government's budget deficit (and larger debt service expenses), or a means to spur local expenditure responsibility is unknown. International experience strongly shows that decentralization can have disastrous effects-including overlapping expenditure provision and macro-instability-if financing precedes functional assignment of responsibilities. It is not known at present how the Government will achieve the 35 percent target, except that it is expected to be achieved gradually.
In FY01, the goal of a 20 percent local share of budgeted revenues was achieved by more than doubling national-to-local subsidies. Financing the increased subsidies to local governments could be achieved by applying surcharges to existing central taxes (e.g., excise taxes on tobacco, alcohol, cars, appliances; the VAT, or petroleum taxes)-with excise taxes most likely to be increased, followed by the VAT. Given the other demands on the budget (i.e., financing the deficit and increased debt service payments), it is clear that financing the costs of decentralization-especially over the medium term when intergovernmental transfers will be increasingly significant source of revenue for local governments-could imply higher tax payments by the public at large. A bigger challenge is in moving to the 35 percent target in 2006, which is less than four years from now.
Subsidies/Intergovernmental Transfers
Prior to FY01, over 70 percent of subsidies (intergovernmental transfers) in Thailand were allocated for specific investment projects. The Ministry of Interior allocated these grants in an ad hoc and highly politicized manner. The amounts allocated vary greatly from year-to-year, and actual allocations are not known until well after the fiscal year begins. Hence the basic requirement of a decentralized system having transparent and stable intergovernmental transfers is violated. Nor does the allocation of subsidies reflect the broader intergovernmental framework, especially the vertical fiscal imbalance between the central and local administrations. Fiscal disparities among local administrations are not addressed in the current subsidy system; establishing an equalization mechanism within the subsidy system is a high priority for future reforms.
Recommendations have been made to the NDC to reform the intergovernmental subsidy system by reducing the reliance on specific project grants and increasing the reliance on general-purpose subsidies that are allocated according to a transparent formula(e) that addresses vertical imbalance and equalization objectives. The allocation formula for general subsidies would be based on a few selective indicators determined by the Ministry of Interior and the Bureau of the Budget. Currently, allocation criteria are being proposed, namely, population, number of students enrolled, development levels based on revenue collection, etc. These subsidies could also promote accountability by being based on performance indicators. Matching grants would still be offered for specific investments (though of smaller magnitude), but a transparent and predictable allocation formula would be used and the matching share would be increased to promote better projects.
The subsidy system is evolving with the process of decentralization. Before FY01, the Central Government relied on the general and specific subsidies. During a transition period, subsidies with transfer of responsibility were introduced to allow the Government to decentralize according to the pace of local capacity building. In FY03, these subsidies are expected to be replaced by sectoral block subsidies. Currently three types of subsidies are used, and a fourth is planned to replace the third in 2003 (see Box 5 below).
• General subsidies are distributed to local administrations based on indicators that are proxies for local government expenditure needs and revenue capacities; these subsidies are administered by DOLA. 9 9 Indicators include number of students, elderly, villages, and population, and local revenue.
Box 5: Thailand's Transfer System over Time

-FY01 FY01 FY02 FY03 -
General and Specific Subsidies Subsidies with Transfer of Responsibility Sectoral Block Subsidies
• Specific subsidies must be spent on specific purposes (e.g., infrastructure); these subsidies are administered by DOLA.
• Subsidies with transfer of responsibility are allocated only to TAOs. These subsidies were used in FY01 and FY02 to aid the transition from central to local service delivery, and to meet the 20 percent target. An amount is set aside for each local government for specific purposes. Before the funds are disbursed, local governments must submit a plan and be able to procure the project. These subsidies are administered by various agencies.
• Sectoral block subsidies are not yet implemented, but are planned to be used in FY03 and beyond. These subsidies would specify which sector the funds should be spent on, while granting local administrations more autonomy than the two grants listed above.
For FY01, the budgeted general and specific subsidies amounted to Baht 41.4 trillion, while subsidies for the transfer of responsibility amounted to Baht 32.3 trillion. Disbursements are monitored by the Comptroller General's Department of the Ministry of Finance. As shown in Table 2 , some of the specific subsidies were disbursed very slowly and these disbursements should be monitored closely. While disbursements were likely to pick up at the end of the fiscal year, disbursements will fall significantly short of the budgeted amount. Disbursement of subsidies with transfer of responsibility depends on tambons' capacity to plan and procure investment projects. These funds are disbursed after BOB's approval of the tambons' proposals. The rapid increase in local government responsibilities between FY00 and FY01 has proven to be a stumbling block. As is evident from Table 2 , only 34.5 percent had been disbursed 8 months into the fiscal year. It is also clear that significant delays are associated with local investment projects, which require more demanding management and procurement by local governments.
The subsidy system relies heavily on negotiation, and whether local governments have the capacity to procure projects. These subsidies suffer from two problems: (i) they do not offset disparities in fiscal capacity (i.e., have an equalizing effect), and (ii) there is great variation in subsidies among local authorities within the same type and class of local government. In fact, the subsidy system appears to distribute funds in a somewhat random manner.
Measuring the equalization impact Thailand's subsidy system is difficult at present, due to limited fiscal and demographic information, especially for individual tambons.. Information on subsidies allocated by local government is collected by DOLA and published by the NESDB.
10
Information on those indicators used to determine the distribution of general and specific subsidies -e.g., population, number of students, number of elderly, average income and other indicators of revenue capacity and expenditure needs --are also available. Tambon-level information could be collected over the medium term.
Local Accountability
Local accountability must be enhanced for decentralization to succeed. Local residents and organizations-local administrations, the private sector, and civil society-best know and understand local problems. Their feedback, through civic fora and payment of local taxes and charges, is necessary to assure high-quality, local decisions. Local administrations must both incorporate this collective wisdom into their decision making, and help these groups to participate more effectively in public affairs by increasing their access to and understanding of public information (including local budgets and development plans.)
At present, local officials are not fully aware of their responsibilities and functions, especially in light of the legislated changes in local administrative organization acts. The Central Government will disseminate these revised acts to all local officials. Nonetheless, local professional associations, citizens and media should reinforce the new roles and functions of local officials. Direct election of all local officials would also enhance local accountability; local elections are in process for local administrations except for provinces (all provincial governors, except for the Governor of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, are appointed by the central government.)
Monitoring the Status of Decentralization
It has only recently become possible-since the establishment of the NDC-to monitor the status of decentralization reforms. For example, the Office of the National Decentralization Committee (ONDC) has recently begun monitoring the status of the decentralization process, as summarized in Appendix Table 1 .
Despite the efforts of the NDC, the Government's overall decentralization policy framework is not clearly understood.
A high priority is to assure that the ONDC is adequately staffed and given sufficient resources to perform its duties. The central government must also develop the capabilities of the ONDC to monitor the status and outcomes of decentralization-both in terms of its potential macroeconomic impact and its achievement of decentralization objectives-and disseminate information on local government finance on a regular basis. This information is important in encouraging local accountability, for monitoring the status of decentralization initiatives, and for introducing subsequent reforms in response to the dynamic nature of intergovernmental fiscal relations.
The Government has begun developing performance indicators to monitor its decentralization program, that measure the quality of human resources, policy effectiveness, fiscal discipline, and efficiency in revenue collection, as well as a database of standardized information about fiscal position, expenditures, and accounting to measure financial accountability. These measures and databases are not yet operational, and yet the transfer of fiscal resources has begun.
Some key questions to consider are:
• How much is being decentralized?
• What functions are being decentralized?
• How efficiently and equitably are services being delivered?
• How efficient is local revenue collection?
Various data are available to shed light on the progress of decentralization, and Appendix Table 2 provides an overview of potential indicators. At present, these data are not collected centrally and must be pieced together from various agencies. The italicized paragraphs in the Table note areas where additional or more timely data should be collected. Three points stand out:
• There is currently no budget nor plan for local expenditures. Action plans have been developed within specific functions, but an aggregate expenditure plan should be developed to direct the decentralization process and to ensure that it corresponds with the revenues devolved to local administrations.
• Bottom-up, fiscal data from local authorities collected by DOLA are reported 18 month after the end of the fiscal year.
• Comprehensive, actual revenue data are not collected centrally. While budgetary data are compiled by the Ministry of Finance's Local Fiscal Policy Division, subsidies to local administrations are not tracked centrally. As noted above, significant discrepancies arise between budgeted and actual local revenues.
The timeliness of data that are reported locally and collected by DOLA could be enhanced in the short term by requiring less richness and by focusing on the most critical data.
The NESDB is developing a computerized system to monitor fiscal decentralization indicators. Data are being collected from DOLA on local expenditures, revenues and subsidies. Current revenue data are available by revenue category for the period FY98-FY00, but the data do not yet include BMA and Pattaya City, and reporting for FY00 include only about half of all local administrations. As the system becomes more complete, it will be a rich source of data for local governments. A computerized, local accounting system is being proposed by DOLA. Such a system would enable much more effective and timely monitoring of local governments.
In addition, local standards and benchmarks do not exist that would enable the central government to monitor and evaluate local performance in infrastructure services, health, education, and land use planning. The development of these indicators and norms will be critical for monitoring local performance, both during the initial phases of decentralization and in subsequent periods.
ENHANCING THE SUCCESS OF THAILAND'S DECENTRALIZATION Strengthen Decentralization Strategy
As noted in the section on global experience with decentralization, a well crafted strategy is a key determinant of the success or failure of decentralization policies. Thailand has many elements of a strategy, including the principles enshrined in the Constitution, the Decentralization Act and various action plans. What is missing at present is a general framework that encompasses all features of decentralization-linking expenditure responsibility with revenue authority, determining grant formulae, developing uniform financial accounts, strengthening capacity in line with devolving responsibility, and monitoring progress and outcomes.
A critical part of this strategy should be further defining the transition plan to meet the Constitutionally mandated targets for 2006. The central government must have a clear strategy for how this will be done, and local governments must have certainty about the phasing in of their new responsibilities and resources.
Integrate Decentralization with Broader Public Sector and Sectoral Reforms
The Government has embarked on an ambitious public sector reform that will fundamentally redefine the role and operation of government agencies. This reform has profound implications for decentralization-especially in redefining the role of the central government, changing how financial and human resources are managed, and transferring civil servants to local administrations. Yet, at present, public sector reform and decentralization policies are not integrated.
Nor are significant sectoral reforms. The Ministries of Education and Public Health are testing decentralized service delivery models. Health and education reforms are being driven by decentralization policies that are specific to those sectors and do not appear to be integrated within the overall decentralization framework. For example, the establishment of Local Education Authorities (see Box 6) is being discussed to deliver local education services in conformance with the National Education Act-yet these Authorities are not necessarily co-terminous with local administration boundaries nor responsibilities. The Ministry of Public Health is supporting the establishment of Provincial Health Authorities (or Boards) that would be responsible and accountable for improving health indicators by purchasing and/or providing the proper mix of health inputs and outputs in order to improve health outcomes. While this proposal would allow for reallocation of costly or unnecessary hospital care to cost-effective preventive and promotive services, as well as specific targeting of vulnerable populations (the poor, hilltribes, risk populations, etc.), it does not take into account the broader responsibilities and authorities of Provincial Administrative Organizations.
Enhance Mechanisms for Implementation and Monitoring
Mechanisms for better coordination among the various agencies involved (e.g., DOLA, the MOF, BOB, OCSC, line ministries, etc.) and resolving conflicts among levels of government should be defined more clearly. Similarly, the Government's information systems and ability to monitor the impact and outcomes of decentralization should be strengthened, both in the ONDC but also in the Ministry of Finance and other agencies.
Box 6. Local Education Authorities
The establishment of Local Education Authorities (LEAs) was mandated in the National Education Act, passed in 1999. LEAs will be created and given authority over curricula, personnel and finance, with significant citizen participation in governance. The boundaries of LEAs will be determined on the basis of demographic and geographic factors with the objective of establishing a size consistent with international research on the relationship between district size and efficiency and quality of education. Staff from the Ministry of Education would be re-deployed to LEAs. The Act also specifies that the education financing system will be radically changed to provide block grants to LEAs and to schools, with amounts based on a standard per capita grant plus additional per capita grants based on poverty and other equity issues, including provision for disadvantaged and handicapped students. Schools within the LEA would be funded on the same basis. LEAs and schools would be empowered to raise additional funds and to determine their use.
Manage Fiscal Risks
As noted earlier, Thailand has decentralized revenues before working out the cost of devolved responsibilities. Reconciling expenditure decentralization with revenue decentralization is perhaps the greatest challenge facing the Government. If 20 percent of revenues are allocated to local governments, but commensurate expenditure responsibility is not devolved, then the central government bears significant risks of assuming the resulting deficit. These risks will be magnified as the local share of revenues increases to 35 percent in 2006. The costs of delivering devolved services should be estimated so that the magnitude of potential fiscal risks is understood. Even if there is a balance between expenditure and revenue decentralization, it is likely that local governments will go through a learning period where service delivery costs exceed those of central provision, and the risks of higher expenditures or lower service levels should be identified and managed.
Reconsider the Structure of Local Administrations
Few countries that have successfully decentralized have done so to over 7,000 local administrations, many of which are unviable in delivering or financing services. In fact, broader discussions of the appropriate structure of local government (e.g., whether an intermediate tier of government is necessary to oversee service delivery and financing, or whether there are too many local government units to be viable) do not appear to be taking place. The Government should consider an asymmetric approach to decentralization, whereby responsibility and resources are devolved first to larger places with stronger capacity while effort is directed to strengthening the smaller and weaker local administrations. 
Appendix
No
Local budgets must still be approved by the provincial governor (or district council) and central agencies monitor spending financed by general and specific subsidies. In FY 01, subsidies were increased to Baht 73.7 billion to meet the 20 percent shared revenue target. Much of this funding is tied to specific functions/programs, thereby restricting local governments' autonomy. In addition, disbursement of grants with transfer of responsibility has been slow due to the BOB's stringent requirements regarding local governments' capacity to plan and procure projects. According to the Comptroller Generals Department, less than 35 percent of the funds allocated had actually been disbursed as of the end of May 2001. Some of the problems with the budget in FY01 have been solved, and disbursements are expected to be faster and smoother in FY02. Beginning in FY03, it is planned that most subsidies will be in the form of sectoral block grants, which will allow local governments more flexibility than the current subsidy structure. It is also expected that at that time, tax sharing arrangements will be more suitable and that local governments will have more authority. 1.4 Do local governments have a reasonable degree of autonomy in service delivery?
Yes
Several of the central agencies consulted indicated that local governments are fairly free to deliver the services in the manner deemed most appropriate and cost effective. Contracting out, for example, is occurring, but no specifics could be given by the central agencies. National laws and regulations, however, still set ceilings on user fees, thereby restricting local governments' ability to recover costs associated with certain services. 1.5 Do local governments have adequate authority to levy taxes and impose fees?
No
The Act details the revenue sources and applicable limits/ceilings, if any, for local governments, but local administrations' ability to set their own tax rates and user fees is still quite limited at present. The NDC has approved various local tax reforms; the property tax and land and construction tax will be reformed to become a broad-based property tax. The cabinet agreed on the Draft Land and Construction Act on September 8, 1997. The Office of the Council of State re-verified the Act, and requested civic forums for citizen input. At present, the Act has been adjusted and will be proposed to the Cabinet, and then the Parliament. 1.6 Do local governments have adequate revenues?
In FY 01, the central government will share more than 20 percent of its revenue with local governments, thereby enhancing local revenues. This target was set, however, without any correspondence to the actual costs of the functions being transferred. Revenues can be evaluated for adequacy only after expenditure responsibilities have been assigned. 1.7 Are local governments authorized to borrow?
Partial
Tesabans and tambons are permitted to borrow under Article 28 of the Act. The Act, however, contradicts existing DOLA regulations, which only permit tesabans to borrow with the governor's concurrence. Regulatory changes are, therefore, necessary, and the law and regulations should also be made consistent with the Public Debt Management Act being considered by the Parliament. 1.8 Are subsidies and shared revenues determined objectively and openly?
No
Most subsidies are distributed on an ad hoc basis. Proposals incorporating more formula-based subsidies and revised tax sharing arrangements are currently being considered. Such changes would greatly enhance transparency and predictability of subsidies and shared revenues, which represent more than 80 percent of local revenues. 1.9 Are allocation formulas simple?
Partial
It depends. Per capita allocations are commonly used, but may be too simple in that they do not reflect revenue capacity or expenditure need. Furthermore, current allocation formulas are based on out-dated socioeconomic and demographic data. 1.10 Are central government subsidies to local governments relatively stable over time?
While subsidy levels have been relatively stable in the past, the formula-based subsidies and revised tax sharing arrangements mentioned earlier will provide greater revenue stability. 
The lack of understanding regarding decentralization within the government indicates weak dissemination of information. Several steps have been taken, however. For example, a brochure on decentralization was recently developed and sent to LGOs to distribute. A seminar was held in June 2001 to discuss obstacles to implementing decentralization and draw upon international experiences. This Decentralization Status Report will hopefully generate useful dialogues on decentralization within the government and between the government and civil society. As previously mentioned, eight regional workshops are planned to disseminate information on the ONDC action plans, once approved by the Government. While its FY01 PR budgets was limited, in and FY02 the ONDC anticipates more funding are inadequate, the ONDC anticipates more funding for radio, television, publications, documentations, and seminars. While no PR role has been defined for central agencies, the Health Ministry has prepared and distributed information on how decentralization will impact health services. 2.2 Are data on central and local resource allocations easily accessed by the public?
General budget information is available in paper form and through the internet, while the availability of detailed data is limited. By law, local budget information must be made publicly available, but actual public disclosure is very limited. In addition, the significant lag (approximately 18 months) in local financial data limit their usefulness. As a result, only keenly interested individuals and groups tend to know where and how to obtain resource allocation information. 2.3 Is performance monitored with emphasis on outcomes?
No
While very little outcome data is currently collected, the performance budget reform underway at the national level will encourage more outcome/impact-oriented budgeting on the local level. 2.4 Are regular and fair elections held on the local level?
Yes
Local council members are elected, but provincial administration is essentially an extension of the central government as the governor is appointed by the Ministry of Interior. Each local administration must report to the provincial governor or district chief. 2.5 Are the terms of office reasonable?
Locally elected officials hold office for a period of four years according to Section IX, Article 284 of Thailand's constitution. Politicians are able to serve more than one term. 2.6 Do citizens participate in local resource allocation decisions?
No
Increasing citizen participation is a major aim of decentralization and citizen involvement in local public decision-making is growing in Thailand. Newspaper editorials and public demonstrations indicate the strength of free press and free speech. Public hearings and civic fora are becoming increasingly common to solicit public opinion and feedback on specific projects. For example, projects must be presented at civic fora before funding from the RUDF can be approved. Public participation in local resource allocation (i.e., annual budgets), however, is still limited. But, in future, Thai people are expected to be more involved in local decision making, and in monitoring and following up how local budgets are used. 
III. LEGAL & REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Yes
Section IX, Article 284 of Thailand's constitution states that special regard be paid to the promotion of decentralization. It also specifies the principles on which decentralization should be implemented in Thailand: the Government must decentralize to local administrative organizations to be independent, decision makers and to develop economic, public utilities, public benefits, infrastructure, and information technology to all people in all local administrations in the Kingdom 3.2 Are the rights and responsibilities of all levels of government codified?
The Act details the functions and responsibilities of the different types of local government organizations (i.e., TAOs, PAOs, BMA).
Do existing laws and regulations support decentralization?
No Many existing laws and regulations must be revised to eliminate contradictions with the Act and subsequent decentralization efforts, as well as to improve clarity. As mentioned previously, the conflict between the Act and existing DOLA regulations pertaining to local borrowing is one example. IV. CIVIL SERVICE 4.1 Do local governments have the authority to hire necessary personnel?
No
Local governments are able to hire contract and low-skilled individuals, but they lack the authority to enlist career and high-skilled employees. The Act of Local Personnel Management (1999) governs such issues. 4.2 Are there plans to develop a local civil service system?
Partial
The subcommittee on human resources (chaired by the OCSC) is currently considering a civil service system for local government employees. Establishing stability and defined career tracks will help make local public service more attractive.
